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Executive Summary 
This report focuses on the handover process from international to local 
actors at the end of peace missions. Three case studies from past UN 
peace operations are used to extract concrete lessons: the United Na-
tions Operation in Burundi (ONUB: 2004–2006), the United Nations 
Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL: 1999–2005) and the United Na-
tions Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET: 2002–2005). The 
emphasis is on the security dimension of the withdrawal phase. Vari-
ous factors in the handover process in the three missions are identi-
fied. The report compares the experiences of the three missions, and 
analyses how these cases dealt with recurrent operational dilemmas 
involved in a handover. Taking account of country developments after 
the missions and the current situation, an assessment is made of the 
importance of these factors to a successful handover.  
 
The resultant empirical findings indicate several lessons relevant for 
peace operations in general and allow cross-fertilization between the 
various international organizations involved in peace missions.
Abbreviations 
AMIB African Mission in Burundi 
BINUB United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi 
(Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi) 
CNDD-FDD Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie- 
Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie 
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 
FNL Forces Nationales de Libération (Burundi) 
IMATT International Military Assistance Training Team 
MONUC United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo 
ONUB United Nations Operation in Burundi 
Palipehutu-FNL Peuple Hutu-Forces Nationales de Libération 
RUF Revolutionary United Front 
SSR Security Sector Reform 
UN CDW United Nations Consolidation, Drawdown and 
Withdrawal 
UNMISET United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor 
UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNIOSIL United Nations Integrated Office for Sierra Leone 
UNOTIL United Nations Office in Timor-Leste 
UNTAET United Nations Transitional Administration in East 
Timor 
 
1. Introduction 
Today various international organizations conduct peace missions, but 
the United Nations remains the principal institution providing peace 
operations. Further to the UN, the African Union, the European Un-
ion, NATO and UN-authorized multinational forces are also undertak-
ing peace missions. All these different peace missions are confronted 
with similar problems. One of these challenges is how to ensure sus-
tainable peace after the closing down of a peace mission. A good 
handover process from international to local actors is instrumental in 
this process.  
 
The existing literature and peacekeeping doctrines have not focused 
on what constitutes a good handover. The bulk of the literature deals 
with the start-up phase of peace operations, motivated by the correct 
observation that quick deployments are essential to settle conflicts. 
Yet, the other end of the spectrum should not be forgotten. Well-
conceived transition phases are crucial to consolidate international 
peace efforts in the long term. The handover matters even more in to-
day’s multidimensional peace missions, where international actors are 
no longer responsible for traditional peacekeeping tasks alone, but 
also for the execution of some state services. This allows government 
structures some breathing space to build up their capacity amidst the 
remaining destruction of the conflict. The departure of a peace mis-
sion initiates the return to normality. At this point, local actors need to 
take back the responsibilities for state services temporarily under the 
peace mission. The handover should thus be carefully planned to de-
fine the right time and means to transfer the authority. Should the 
handover fail to provide the required security guarantees, a relapse 
into conflict is possible and even highly probable. 
 
The aim of this report is to add to our understanding of the handover 
process. The emphasis of the study is on the security dimension, be-
cause security aspects are central, both during the withdrawal phase 
and for the long-term viability of the state structures. The methodol-
ogy involves examining empirical data on handover processes in three 
selected case studies were selected: the United Nations Operation in 
Burundi (ONUB: 2004–2006), the United Nations Mission in Sierra 
Leone (UNAMSIL: 1999– 2005) and the United Nations Mission of 
Support in East Timor (UNMISET: 2002– 2005). All three are now-
concluded UN operations of the same generation of robust peace mis-
sions, but differ in the reasons for intervention. By investigating both 
their similarities and their differences, this report identifies a number 
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of specific lessons on the handover process. However, the aim is by no 
means to provide comprehensive guidelines on managing a handover 
process. Further research is needed for that. The outcome of this re-
port should be rather seen as a snapshot of empirical data. Experiences 
from some UN missions will allow cross-fertilization between the 
various international organizations involved in peace missions.  
 
We begin by introducing the subject of handover and the case studies. 
In the main part of the report, several factors affecting the handover 
process are examined and placed in the context of the case studies. We 
also describe some recurrent operational dilemmas. A further section 
evaluates developments in the three countries since the closing of the 
peace missions. This effort enables us to make a statement on the im-
portance of the factors for a successful peace mission. The conclusion 
offers a range of concrete lessons identified in the case studies. 
 
2. The subject of handover 
This report focuses on practical examples of handovers in peace mis-
sions. In order to understand the importance of the handover phase for 
establishing a safe and secure environment after a conflict, we should 
begin by conceptualizing the issue within conflict resolution frame-
works. That will allows us to identify the requirements and priorities 
of a transition phase. On the other hand, it must be admitted that such 
conceptualizing is not always possible on the ground.  
 
A post-war reconstruction process can be divided into three main 
phases: intervention, stabilization and normalization (or consolida-
tion). It is mainly the two first phases that are relevant here. The final 
phase, normalization, focuses on social and economic progress and 
falls outside the framework of this report.  
 
The focus of the intervention phase lies on security and law and order, 
so as to prevent an immediate relapse into conflict. ‘It is the immedi-
ate priority of peacemakers and peacekeepers in peace support opera-
tions to stabilize the country until such a stage that national institu-
tions can assume their security, administrative and other state func-
tions. This includes not just the military, but also the police and the 
judiciary.’ (Gambari, 2002) The intervention phase ends with the 
handover to local actors. The stabilization phase ‘is defined as the 
point at which enough progress has been made in stabilizing the do-
mestic political situation to enable a safe handover of power to a host 
government and to undertake the first stage of international with-
drawal.’  (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2005)  
 
The process of transferring authority from international to local actors 
is crucial to the entire peace process. If the peace mission withdraws 
precipitately, the society might relapse into conflict. A carefully 
planned exit strategy is important to prevent disruption of the peace 
process. (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 
2008) Whereas the first phase tends to be top–down and driven by ex-
ternal actors (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2005), the handover 
should occur in close consultation with all relevant actors and national 
stakeholders. Local ownership and capacity-building create legitimacy 
for both the government and the peace force, and sustainability after 
the mission had left. (Wilén, 2009) 
 
Assessing the degree of progress is a complex matter. There is no 
fixed list of target benchmarks, nor are they always easily measurable. 
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In general, sustainable peace can be said to exist within a state when 
the conflicts in that society are no longer resolved by violence, but are 
regulated through government institutions. (Secretary-General, 20 
April 2001) Based upon the priorities of the intervention phase, the 
stability requirements for a solid handover process rely mainly, but 
not exclusively, on the progress of security sector reform. ‘Peacekeep-
ing transition and exit strategies depend on countries providing for 
their own security, and the UN will need to find effective ways to sup-
port this goal through better rule of law and security sector reform 
assistance.’  (Department of Peacekeeping Operations and 
Department of Field Support, July 2009) The national army and police 
should have gained enough capacity and credibility to perform their 
internal and external security tasks. (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & 
Miall, 2005) Once this stage is reached, the international military 
troops can pull out and the focus can shift from peacekeeping to 
peacebuilding activities. The society will require continuous support 
from the international community in dealing with the social and eco-
nomic root causes of conflict in the stabilization phase. 
 
It seems thus that a handover has the difficult task of reconciling the 
military-oriented exit mission with the ‘new’ civilian-focused actors. 
This concept of peace operations relies on the assumption that security 
is a precursor to the reconstruction and development dimensions of 
peacebuilding. In this reasoning, development activities cannot take 
place in an environment where fighting is still going on. Efforts will 
focus on ending the conflict, while long-term development goals may 
be sacrificed in favour of immediate stability needs. However, be-
tween the point when military operations stop and when civilian 
peacebuilding takes over, there is a risk of a vacuum. (Gueli & 
Liebenberg, 2007) This brings us to the midst of the debate about the 
‘gap’ between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, also involving the 
‘perennial challenge of linking peacekeeping and broader peacebuild-
ing strategies into a coherent whole.’ (Center on International 
Cooperation, 2009)  
 
Yet, the days of traditional UN peacekeeping missions are over, and 
the gap has been partly filled. Despite the evident importance of secu-
rity aspects in the first phase, it is generally agreed that security alone 
cannot create a sustainable state. Finding the balance is crucial. To-
day’s peace operations are thus no longer solely military. Civilians are 
playing a growing role, working on programmes that last longer than 
the individual peace missions. Current peace operations have units to 
deal with political affairs, HIV/AIDS, gender, civil affairs and elec-
tions. Especially programmes such as Disarmament, Demobilization 
and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR)  are cru-
cial for the bridge between military and civilian parts of a mission and 
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consequently between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Such pro-
grammes offer concrete areas where peacekeepers, humanitarian 
workers and development workers can work together.  
 
The whole handover can thus be divided into two succeeding parts. At 
first, the responsibilities handed over to the local actors immediately 
after the departure of a peace mission are mainly security-oriented. It 
is this activity and associated issues that will be the focus of our re-
port. In a second phase, civilian tasks will be handed over. Humanitar-
ian and development tasks will remain the prerogative of international 
organizations for much longer after the peace mission has left. This 
may in some cases be under the umbrella of a follow-on mission. It 
can only be expected that the national government will supply full so-
cial services to its population in the longer term. However, these as-
pects of the ‘second’, more civilian-oriented, handover fall beyond the 
scope of this research report. 
3. Case studies  
3.1. Sierra Leone 
Rebels, mining interests, 
coups d’état and mercenaries 
are terms that best capture 
Sierra Leone’s collapse into 
turmoil and conflict in the 
1990s. Various international 
efforts of the Economic 
Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) and the 
UN to settle the conflict be-
tween the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) and the 
government of Sierra Leone 
failed. But when, in 1998, the 
previously elected president 
Kabbah returned to power in 
Freetown, the UN saw a first real chance for peace. The United Na-
tions Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, UNOMSIL, was established 
to disarm the combatants and to rebuild the country’s security forces. 
Fighting did not stop, however. Rebels took control over Freetown 
once again. International troops ousted them soon afterwards and rein-
stalled Kabbah to power. Diplomatic efforts were scaled up, resulting 
in the Lomé Agreements in July 1999. The ceasefire included a 
strengthened role for the UN peace mission to assist with the imple-
mentation of the Lomé Agreements. 
 
The Security Council established the United Nations Mission in Sierra 
Leone (UNAMSIL) on 22 October 1999 through Resolution 1270. 
The mission was mandated to implement DDR programmes, to ensure 
the security and freedom of UN personnel, to monitor the ceasefire, to 
create confidence-building mechanisms, to facilitate humanitarian as-
sistance, to support human rights operations and to provide support to 
the elections (UNAMSIL, 2009). The original mandate soon proved to 
be too weak and, in February 2000, stronger security tasks were 
added. These included the provision of security and assistance to the 
national law enforcement authorities. The number of military person-
nel was raised from 6,000 to 11,000, including 260 military observers. 
In March 2001, the Security Council further increased the number up 
to 17,500. This was the result of the kidnapping of hundreds of peace-
keepers by the RUF in May 2000. To that event, the United Kingdom 
Figure 1: Map of Sierra Leone (ICG) 
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sent in a military force to restore the ceasefire, and subsequently took 
responsibility for restructuring the army. In 2002, the war was offi-
cially declared over, and successful elections were held later that year. 
UNAMSIL started a gradual drawdown, and left the country at the end 
of 2005. Security functions were handed over to national structures. 
Stability concerns did remain, however, mainly resulting from eco-
nomic and social factors. Therefore, a follow-up mission was estab-
lished, the UN Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL). (Center 
on International Cooperation, 2006) 
 
Thus, UNAMSIL intervened to back a previously elected government 
and to restore democracy. This case study puts forward some specific 
factors. First, we need to investigate whether the former rebels can be 
considered as spoilers in the handover process. Also the dynamics 
around the mining industry must be taken into account, since competi-
tion over mining industry was a key motive for the conflict. Another 
characteristic is the regional dimension, with lingering conflicts in 
neighbouring countries. Finally, the role of the UK in the restructuring 
of the army deserves some attention. 
3.2 Timor-Leste 
The involvement of the UN 
in Timor-Leste dates back to 
the 1960s. At that time, East 
Timor was a non-self-
governing territory adminis-
tered by its former colonizer, 
Portugal. When in 1975 a 
part of the population 
declared independence, the 
country was promptly 
occupied by neighbouring 
Indonesia, and was annexed 
in 1976. For the next two 
decades, the issue lingered on the 
agenda of the UN. Indonesia’s 
intervention was not recognized, but despite a series of talks with In-
donesia and Portugal a solution was not found. A breakthrough finally 
came in 1999, when both countries agreed to a referendum in which 
the population could opt for autonomy under Indonesian rule, or inde-
pendence. The UN was asked to organize this consultation, and in 
June 1999, the Security Council established the United Nations Mis-
sion in East Timor – UNAMET. When the results of the referendum 
expressed an overwhelming aspiration for independence, pro-
Indonesian militias threw the country into chaos, causing considerable 
Figure 2: Map of Timor‐Leste (ICG)
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devastation. Indonesia was unable to halt the violence and accepted an 
international security presence. The Australian-led multinational force 
INTERFET was authorized by the Security Council under Chapter 
VII. In October 1999, the authority vacuum left by Indonesia was 
filled by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET), which governed the country until its official independ-
ence on 20 May 2002. When UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
handed over political authority to the local government, the infant na-
tion was still weak in terms of security and safety. (Center on 
International Cooperation, 2006) 
 
On 17 May 2002, the United Nations Mission of Support in East 
Timor (UNMISET) was authorized by the Security Council by Reso-
lution 1410. The mandate of this new mission consisted of granting 
assistance to core administrative structures, providing interim law en-
forcement and public security, assisting in the development of a new 
law enforcement agency, and contributing to the maintenance of ex-
ternal and internal security. The operation was to consist of 1,250 ci-
vilian police and 5,000 military troops, including 120 military observ-
ers, as well as several civilian components. UNMISET completed its 
mandate in May 2005, one year later than expected. Since some issues 
remained outstanding, the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste 
(UNOTIL) was mandated to support administrative and justice sys-
tems, to continue the development of law enforcement agencies and to 
support security and stability in the country. (UNMISET, 2009) 
 
In this situation, the UN executed transitional assistance for postcolo-
nial independence in East Timor. This situation is different from other 
contexts since all institutions needed to be established: the former 
ones had ceased to exist with the departure of the Indonesians. The 
concept of the handover was first to transfer basic political responsi-
bilities to the local authorities and consequently strengthen security 
functions. Here we may note that the mandate of UNMISET was con-
sidered successful, while some parts of the mandate were conse-
quently transferred to the follow-on mission. 
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3.3 Burundi 
The conflict in Burundi must 
be seen in light of the regional 
ethnical tensions between the 
Hutu and the Tutsi ethnic 
groups. After the assassination 
of the democratically elected 
president Melchiro in October 
1993, violence broke out 
between the government and 
several Hutu and Tutsi 
groupings. Only in 2000, under 
the auspices of former 
Tanzanian president Julius 
Nyerere, were the Arusha Accords 
signed. However, two main Hutu 
rebel groups – the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-
Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD) and the Peu-
ple Hutu-Forces Nationales de Libération (Palipehutu-FNL) – did not 
sign the agreement. Fighting continued to endanger the peace process, 
when a transitional government was established in 2001. Two years 
later, the CNDD-FDD eventually signed a ceasefire agreement. In 
2003, the first-ever African Union peacekeeping mission, the African 
Mission in Burundi (AMIB), was deployed. (Center on International 
Cooperation, 2006) In December 2003, the African Union asked the 
UN to take over the peacekeeping responsibilities due to logistical and 
financial constraints. (Jackson, July 2006) 
 
The United Nations Operations in Burundi (ONUB) was established 
by Security Council Resolution 1545 on 21 May 2004 to assist in the 
implementation of the Arusha Accords. ONUB was mandated to en-
sure respect for ceasefire agreements, to carry out disarmament and 
demobilization parts of the national DDR programme and to monitor 
the illegal flow of arms across the borders. The mandate also included 
assistance to humanitarian assistance and peaceful elections. Finally, 
ONUB was tasked with supporting the government in extending its 
authority throughout the territory, including police and judicial institu-
tions. Authorization was given for a maximum of 5,650 military per-
sonnel, including 200 military observers and 125 staff officers, 120 
police and civilian staff. During the operations of ONUB, successful 
elections were conducted and the leader of the former CNDD-FDD 
was elected as president. The Burundian government and the UN set 
the departure of ONUB to 31 December 2006. A ceasefire with the 
Palipehutu-FNL was signed in September 2006. After the departure of 
ONUB, an integrated office, the Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies au 
Burundi (BINUB), started working from January 2007 onwards. The 
Figure 3: Map of Burundi (ICG)
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mandate of BINUB included continuation of DDR and SSR pro-
grammes. (ONUB, 2009) 
 
ONUB intervened in Burundi to provide post-settlement peace sup-
port. This different kind of intervention offers several topics for re-
search. Firstly, the continuation of rebel activities also during the mis-
sion is remarkable. Although the last rebel force had signed a ceasefire 
months before the end of ONUB, the integration process could not 
have been finished, as violence continued during the handover proc-
ess. Secondly, the border areas are of significance, as combatants op-
erated from neighbouring countries. Thirdly, it is also relevant to con-
sider the influence of the political change on the future presence of the 
UN in the country. 
4. Factors in the handover process  
4.1. Planning the mission’s departure 
In 2001, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan defended a report to the 
Security Council titled ‘No Exit Without Strategy’. The report analy-
ses when a peace mission should withdraw and concludes that ‘a good 
exit or transition strategy depends on a good entrance strategy.’ 
(S/2001/394 - No exit without Strategy) The point is clear: the with-
drawal should be planned prior to when Blue Helmets set foot in the 
conflict zone. Despite Annan’s recommendation, exit strategies are 
not necessarily a part of a mission’s mandate. Here we examine when 
exit strategies were planned in the three case studies, and highlight the 
differences. 
 
UNMISET occupies a rare position in the field of peace missions, 
since a complete exit strategy was already contained in the establish-
ment plans for the mission. The planning for UNMISET started a year 
earlier through working groups in the field and in New York, and a 
wide range of civilian, police and military stakeholders were con-
sulted. Consequently, the objectives and the timeline for UNMISET 
were concise and clear. The mission would gradually reduce the UN 
peacekeeping presence in the country and lead Timor-Leste into the 
traditional development framework. It was envisaged that UNMISET 
would be able to withdraw in two years when local authorities as-
sumed responsibility for ensuring stability in the country. 
(S/2002/432) ‘The Council agrees that the new mission should be 
based on the premise that operational responsibilities should be de-
volved to the East Timorese authorities as soon as this is feasible, and 
it supports a continuing process of assessment and downsizing over a 
period of two years, starting from independence.’ (S/PRST/2001/32) 
 
The handover to national authorities was planned. An agreement be-
tween the UN and the Transitional Government of Timor-Leste out-
lined the modalities for transferring police executive tasks. The grad-
ual handover of responsibilities would proceed in parallel with the cer-
tification of police officers and the accreditation of their districts. The 
first district would be handed over already at the time of independ-
ence, the following four districts in December 2002, and the last eight 
in November 2003. By January 2004, only 100 international officers 
would remain in an advisory role. At that time, the local authorities 
would also be able to assume the responsibility for guaranteeing the 
external security of the country. The withdrawal of the UN military 
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troops and military observers was to occur in four phases, as shown in 
Figure 4. 
 
 
 
 
Such detailed exit planning did not characterize the deployment plans 
of ONUB and UNAMSIL. For Sierra Leone, proposals for reducing 
the mission were made in September 2002, more than three years be-
fore the mission finally left the country. The presidential and parlia-
mentary elections in May 2002 had been successful and the enhanced 
security situation continued to hold. By January 2003, the disarma-
ment process was completed and the first deployments of the local se-
curity sector agencies were a fact. Humanitarian access had also im-
proved considerably. While serious security challenges remained, 
these developments were considered sufficient to start planning the 
final phase of the operation. ‘The task of downsizing the Mission, 
while at the same time consolidating the peace and addressing the 
remaining security challenges, will be a delicate one requiring careful 
assessment and balancing.’ (S/2002/987) Two scenarios were sug-
gested. The worst-case scenario relied on the assumption of a weak 
security sector. In this case, the timeline given was not more specific 
than ‘a considerable time’. The second scenario was held more likely, 
namely that  the military troops could withdraw in approximately two 
years, in December 2004. This would demand significant international 
investments in the development of police and armed forces. In both 
cases, UNAMSIL would be withdrawn in three phases. The first phase 
would consist of withdrawing 600 troops from the Bangladeshi and 
Figure 4: UNMISET military component four‐phase plan (S/2002/432)
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Nigerian contingents by the end of 2002. The second phase would 
lead to drawing down 3,900 troops between January and August 2003. 
The third phase was planned for late 2004, with the reduction from 
13,000 to some 2,000 forces. (S/2002/987) 
 
Likewise, no exit plans were made before the start of ONUB. One ex-
planation is that time was short between the decision to intervene and 
the actual deployment, leaving little opportunity for exit planning. The 
quick deployment was possible due to the re-hatting of AMIB peace 
soldiers to ‘Blue Helmets’ and the previous UN involvement. 
(S/RES/1545 (2004)) A first recommendation to adapt ONUB was 
finally made in November 2005 after an UN assessment mission had 
visited Burundi. The initial exit-planning process was immediately 
accelerated, due to the pressure exerted by the newly elected govern-
ment for an early exit of the peace mission, to which we return in the 
next section. The government demanded the departure of all ONUB 
personnel by the second half of 2006. The first national contingent of 
ONUB would therefore still withdraw at the end of 2005. A second 
phase would then occur during April to June 2006, involving an addi-
tional 2000 troops. (S/2005/728) The final phase of withdrawing 3000 
troops had to be finalized by December 2006, as agreed between the 
UN and the national authorities. (S/2006/163) 
 
The planning for the handover of responsibilities occurred at different 
points in the timelines of the three cases. While for Timor-Leste a 
well-thought plan was available before the start of the mission, that 
was not the case with the other two missions. Plans for withdrawing 
UNAMSIL were made in the middle of the mission at a point when 
satisfactory progress in the peace process was observed. The exit 
strategy for ONUB was planned towards the end of the mission. In all 
cases, the importance of local actors and developments is evident – be 
it in the development of the security sector, the successful completion 
of elections or the interaction with the national government.  
4.2 Driver of the handover process 
Planning is necessarily a continuous process, since new information 
may emerge or unforeseen events occur, forcing the plan to be 
changed during its implementation. Planning also depends on who 
drives the process and who consequently defines the withdrawal 
schedule. This driver may be the national or the international actors, 
or can be based upon consensus involving both. Here we will situate 
the case studies within one of these three possibilities and indicates 
the danger of an unbalanced exit of a peace mission. 
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The most straightforward example is ONUB. The government of Bu-
rundi asked a visiting mission of the Security Council in November 
2005 that the UN should focus solely on development and reconstruc-
tion assistance in the country. The UN assistance in conducting elec-
tions had been appreciated, but the government believed that the tran-
sition phase was now over. The government argued that the national 
security forces were now capable of independently ensuring the 
county’s security. Moreover, they take over other tasks of ONUB, 
such as guaranteeing the security of humanitarian personnel and the 
demobilization centres, as well as the provision of logistics and trans-
port support for the return of refugees. The military components of 
ONUB were thus requested to pull out as soon as possible. The Secu-
rity Council warned the government of the dangers of a quick with-
drawal, but the tone was set. Joint consultations took place to define a 
gradual but prompt exit of the UN peace mission. (S/2005/728).  
 
The explanation for this change in attitude is to be found in political 
developments. The recent elections had brought the former leader of 
the rebel movement CNDD-FDD, Pierre Nkurunziza, to power, and 
the newly elected government wanted to consolidate its authority. 
Since ONUB had been working closely with the Transitional Gov-
ernment, it believed that ONUB would hamper this process. The 
population reflected the opinion of their government. A public opinion 
survey conducted in March 2006 concluded that the population did 
indeed observe an improvement in the security situation and appreci-
ated the role of the peace mission in the elections. Yet three-quarters 
of the respondents considered it time for ONUB to leave the country. 
(Krasno, June 2006) The UN could not fully counteract this mistrust, 
and for the remainder of ONUB’s duration, the decision of the gov-
ernment influenced the operation. ‘Thus, the second half of 2006 was 
mainly dedicated to the transition and planning for integration and 
restoring and sustaining a cooperative trusting working relation be-
tween the Government and the UN.’ (United Nations Peace 
Operations, February 2008) 
 
Some argue that ONUB failed to realize in time the direction of politi-
cal developments, due to weak and understaffed intelligence gather-
ing. (Jackson, July 2006) Others say that ONUB was not able to grasp 
local ownership in the peace progress since the UN owned most of the 
decision-making process. In a country that had had functioning institu-
tions in the past, such ‘assertive’ behaviour was not welcomed. 
(Wilén, 2009) As a result, the timing of the exit of ONUB became di-
rected by bottom–up demands through the pressure of the newly 
elected government. 
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The opposite situation can be observed in Timor-Leste. Here, pressure 
to close the mission came from the top, from UN headquarters, due to 
overstretch and financial reasons (Jones, Gowan, & Sherman, April 
2009). The authorities of Timor-Leste, lacking self-confidence, would 
have preferred the peace mission to stay. As in Burundi, the popula-
tion shared the concerns of their government. This observation indi-
cates that legitimacy and 
credibility of the new instituti-
ons in the perception of the lo-
cal population are not to be 
forgotten in the handover 
phase. This is especially impo-
rtant in the light of peace-
building tasks in current peace-
keeping missions. Without the 
support of the population, it 
becomes difficult to sustain the 
achievements of the peace mis-
sion. (Higashi, March 2009) 
 
The intermediate solution can be seen in Sierra Leone. More than the 
other two missions, UNAMSIL seems to have been driven by devel-
opments on the ground. The handover of the mission in Sierra Leone 
was the result of a dialogue between the government and the UN. 
Withdrawal plans were set up in consultation with the national au-
thorities, the police and army, and suggestions made by the President 
were taken into account (S/2002/975). International partners, such as 
ECOWAS, donors and the diplomatic community, were also consulted 
(S/2002/987). 
 
The examples of Timor-Leste and Burundi indicate that a peace mis-
sion never enters into a vacuum. At the same time, the example of 
UNAMSIL shows that it is possible to integrate local dynamics and 
local ownership in the planning. In order to avoid a request for leaving 
early or staying longer, a handover plan has the advantage of being 
context-sensitive. To measure developments on the ground and set the 
right time to handover, clear benchmarks can be set. These bench-
marks are the topic of the next section. 
4.3 Benchmarks to measure progress of the mission 
The UN Security Council has the final responsibility to decide when a 
peace mission should transfer authority. The Security Council takes 
such a decision after being briefed by the UN Secretariat about the 
progress in the peace process, although no generic check-list exists to 
identify the optimal time to withdraw. (United Nations Department of 
Figure  5:  SC  votes  Res  1543  to  extend  the 
mandate of UNMISET  for another six months 
(UN Photo) 
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Peacekeeping Operations, 2008) Since every mission takes place in a 
unique setting, peace missions can use context-sensitive benchmarks. 
The theory, as explained in the introduction to this report, would ex-
pect security indicators to be crucial in measuring the progress of a 
peace mission. In the following, we investigate the importance of se-
curity indicators versus development benchmarks in the three case 
studies. 
 
In Sierra Leone, the exit of UNAMSIL was guided by five clear and 
concise benchmarks. Those benchmarks were defined by the Secre-
tary-General in September 2002 to form the key measures for the 
handover process. The measures made it possible to pinpoint which 
sectors still required additional support and investments from national 
and international stakeholders. The principal benchmark was indeed 
security-related and dealt with the capacity-building of the national 
army and police. The reform of the security forces was the subject of 
cooperation between bilateral and multilateral investment. Firstly, the 
restructuring of the army was led by the United Kingdom, as ex-
plained above. This International Military Advisory and Training 
Team (IMATT) made progress up until September 2002, but contin-
ued efforts were required before UNAMSIL could withdraw. Solu-
tions had to be found for the remaining gaps in accommodation and 
equipment. Secondly, police reform was a task of UNAMSIL, but suf-
fered from the same problems. The target size of the police force was 
fixed by the government at 9,500 staff. This size was supposed to be 
reached before UNAMSIL withdrew. But as of September 2002, a fur-
ther 3,000 cadets still had to be found and trained. (S/2002/987) 
 
The other four benchmarks were aimed at reducing the remaining se-
curity challenges. They included completing the DDR programme 
through reintegration of disarmed and demobilized soldiers. As of 
September 2002, however, 24,000 of the 55,000 former combatants 
were still awaiting reintegration into society. As long as they were not 
integrated, they were seen as a possible source of instability. A next 
benchmark, distinctive for Sierra Leone, concerned diamond mining. 
This sector needed to come under government control to prevent fur-
ther conflicts, and the revenues were also needed to complement the 
state budget. Remaining challenges were caused by the ill-equipped 
infrastructure in the mines and the absence of a functioning system to 
provide mining licences. The next benchmark, also part of the Lomé 
Agreements, was the consolidation of state authority over the entire 
country. A fully functioning local administrative structure was im-
peded by vacant posts and, once more, a lack of infrastructure. Fi-
nally, the continuing conflict in neighbouring Liberia risked endanger-
ing the handover process, out of concern for renewed spill-over of the 
conflict. (S/2002/987) 
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From September 2002, gradual process occurred in the five bench-
marks in Sierra Leone. The DDR programme was closed in March 
2004 when all former soldiers were reintegrated. The mining industry 
came increasingly under government control and profits accrued to the 
state budget. Support to the local administration became more and 
more a prerogative of other international actors, like the World Bank 
and UNDP. Yet, at the end of 2004, a residual UNAMSIL presence of 
4,000 troops was maintained to focus on three outstanding bench-
marks: strengthening the capacity of the army and the police, consoli-
dating state authority throughout the country, and consolidating the 
deployment of the peace mission in Liberia. (S/2005/273) Further in-
vestments were made in these three sectors during that final year. 
(S/2005/777) 
 
In Timor-Leste, the mission was oriented around three core pro-
grammes, and withdrawing the mission had to be measured against 
these three benchmarks. The first programme focused on stability, 
democracy and justice, including continuous support to the newly es-
tablished public administration structures and assistance in investiga-
tions of serious crime cases. The second programme on internal secu-
rity and law enforcement is more relevant for this report. This task in-
volved both the execution of policing tasks as well as the development 
of the police forces. The target strength of the police force in Timor-
Leste was 2,830 staff and included border and immigration officers. 
The third programme dealt with external security and border control. 
The main threat at the time was the militia operating from West Timor 
in Indonesia, and a secure border became a condition for UNMISET 
to pull out. The UNMISET military component would guarantee the 
territorial integrity of the country until the East Timor Defence Force 
was capable of taking over. Responsibility for border patrolling and 
immigration would be transferred to the police, so the development of 
national border security was also instrumental in this matter. This task 
was, however, dependent on the demarcation of the border between 
Timor-Leste and Indonesia. (S/2002/432) UNMISET would be guided 
by these benchmarks, even though they would not be fully completed 
by the end of its mandate. 
 
As to Burundi, the UN Secretary-
General indicated before the start of 
ONUB that the force would stay until 
when the likelihood of ethnic rivalries 
had decreased. (S/2004/210) While 
this benchmark was rather general and 
difficult to measure, it would also not 
be achieved, as ONUB left before the 
ceasefire with the last rebel force could Fig 6: Disarmament in Burundi (UN Photo)
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be implemented. In reality, there was no time for ONUB to set clear 
benchmarks, since the peace process was overrun by the government 
pressure for the peace keeping troops to leave the country. For the last 
remaining months of ONUB, it would become more a matter of what 
benchmarks could still be achieved in the time remaining. (Jackson, 
July 2006) Some key security challenges were put forward in Septem-
ber 2005 and were used to measure progress on the ground.  
 
Firstly, the inclusion of the remaining rebel force Forces Nationales de 
Libération (FNL) in the peace process was considered a major security 
threat, especially in the western border provinces. Secondly, SSR was 
both an opportunity and a challenge, providing the basic for stability, 
but also endangering it unless properly implemented. Capable and 
functioning national security agencies were considered essential for 
maintaining stability in the country, but as of September 2005 the 
government did not yet have a comprehensive implementation pro-
gramme. At that point, the National Defence Force counted 33,000 
personnel, too large for Burundi. The aim of the government was to 
reduce this number to 25,000 by the end of 2007. A third concern was 
the completion of disarmament and demobilization and progress in the 
reintegration programme. The disarmament process was hampered by 
incorrect data, while small arms remained widely spread in society. 
Reintegration assistance had started only recently through the National 
Commission for DDR, funded by international donors. Furthermore, 
the return of refugees increased significantly with the improved secu-
rity situation after the elections. However, it was uncertain whether 
the country, even with international support, would be able to absorb 
such a large number of refugees. Finally, the regional security situa-
tion in the Great Lakes Region was a challenge, especially due to the 
proximity with the Kivu regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(S/2005/728) The remaining challenges for ONUB in this limited time 
framework were thus sizeable. It is thus not surprising that not all of 
them had been dealt with by the time ONUB left. 
 
We can conclude that in all three situations, security concerns were 
indeed considered principal benchmarks guiding the handover proc-
ess. The political and economic benchmarks were only a function of 
the stability situation. The peace missions mainly implemented their 
exit strategies based upon the progress of SSR and DDR.   
4.4 The influence of violence during the handover process 
From the conclusion above, we could expect the continued occurrence 
of violence to influence exit planning. Violence in the transition phase 
was indeed present in all three peace missions. Subsequently, some 
security incidents caused the withdrawal schemes to be postponed, 
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whereas other missions seemed unaffected by the volatile situation. In 
this section, we will categorize the security incidents in the peace mis-
sions and link them with the flexibility of the withdrawal scheme. 
 
Firstly, security threats can originate from within society, and the 
causes may be economic or social distress. In Sierra Leone, for exam-
ple unemployed youth groups caused considerable instability. Another 
factor can be continuing popular support for former rebels when they 
are brought to trial. The activities of the Special Court in Sierra Leone 
were closely followed by UNAMSIL out of fear of security incidents. 
In March 2003, a plan by former combatants and active soldiers to 
hinder the function of the Court was discovered, even prior to the start 
of the Court’s activities. (S/2003/321) Yet, despite the existence of 
these security threats, the extension of UNAMSIL remained mainly 
guided by concerns as to the capacity of the security sector. Security 
threats were carefully monitored within the set benchmarks. 
 
Similar security threats had far greater influence in Timor-Leste. In 
March 2003, the UN Secretary-General reported that the current secu-
rity situation did not allow the withdrawal schedule to be maintained, 
and that ‘the mandate implementation plan that was endorsed by the 
Security Council was prepared at a time of optimism.’ (S/2003/243) 
The reason for this statement was the occurrence of several security 
incidents and the related inadequate reaction by the national security 
agencies. Departure of the peace mission could thus lead to a relapse 
in the stability of the country. This led to a serious recoil in the with-
drawal plan of the mission, which was postponed by a year. The com-
position and strength of UNMISET police component was adjusted to 
focus more on capacity-building. (S/2003/243)  
 
Figure 7: Source: (S/2004/333) 
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A second type of security threats may come from parties to the con-
flict who refuse to cooperate in the peace process. In Timor-Leste, 
evidence indicated that former militia and armed groups were scaling 
up their capacity inside the country in March 2003. Such movements 
could have found support in the refugee population still located in In-
donesia and also amongst groups of youths inside the country. 
(S/2003/243) The case study that best points up the risk of spoilers of 
the peace process is Burundi, where the rebel movement FNL re-
mained active in the northwestern border provinces. Towards the end 
of the ONUB mission, security concerns increased due to continuous 
violence between the government and the FNL. Despite the ceasefire 
in September 2006, the implementation of the mutual agreement lin-
gered behind. The FNL refused to cooperate based upon a demand to 
release its prisoners. The ceasefire actually assigned additional re-
sponsibilities to ONUB, in contrast to its rapid downsizing. The peace 
mission was tasked with ensuring the security of the assembly areas of 
the FNL rebels, while a special South African task force was assigned 
to guarantee the safety of the rebels moving to these areas. One addi-
tional ONUB battalion was asked to remain in the country until De-
cember 2006. (S/2006/842) In the end, ONUB was not able to perform 
any of these tasks. The process was repeatedly postponed, and ONUB 
still had to pull out. The timeline for withdrawal, in agreement with 
the national government, allowed no flexibility in planning beyond 31 
December 2006. (S/2006/994) 
 
Thirdly, security threats can be driven by external events, be they re-
gional conflicts or friction with a neighbouring country. For example, 
Burundi is situated in the volatile Great Lakes Region, where external 
threats abounded. ONUB continued to redirect adequate attention and 
resources to the border area, and the cooperation between the peace 
missions on both sides of the border with the Democratic Republic of 
Congo functioned well. Regional cooperation between peace missions 
to reduce the risks associated with the border also took place in Sierra 
Leone after the set-up of the peace mission in Liberia in 2003. 
(S/2002/1417) Before that, the border was insecure, with regional con-
flicts providing opportunities for new recruitment to the rebel move-
ments. (S/2003/944) Another kind of border problem occurred in 
Timor-Leste. The full demarcation of the border between Indonesia 
and Timor-Leste remained outstanding at the time of UNMISET’s de-
parture. (S/2005/310) The peace mission tried to compensate for the 
related insecurities by setting aside more resources for executive tasks 
late in the handover phase and by keeping the military surveillance at 
the border. (S/2003/243) 
 
We can conclude that security concerns make flexible planning neces-
sary. However, it is not the type of security incidents that determine 
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whether the withdrawal scheme will be adjusted or not. Any security 
incidents need to be viewed in the context of the mission, and other 
factors have to be taken in consideration as well. It appears crucial to 
have security concerns properly included in the benchmarks for the 
handover timing. Nevertheless, in some cases, security incidents did 
create a highly insecure environment at the time of mission closure. 
But when exit was not solely dependent on progress in the bench-
marks, troop withdrawal occurred as planned.  
 
Poorly managed security incidents can break the confidence of the lo-
cal actors. On the other hand, the occurrence of security incidents dur-
ing a peace mission may also be perceived as an opportunity. Mitiga-
tion actions can still be undertaken by international actors, if local ac-
tors are not capable of providing a response adequate to the incident. 
When civil disturbance cases are the problem, greater investments 
should be made in training the police. When the border is instable, the 
border control and/or the army require more attention. It is essential 
that security incidents be dealt with properly, leaving no room for re-
currence. A good security assessment is instrumental. But even when 
security incidents are taken into serious consideration, does this auto-
matically lead to a stable environment? What other indicators of stabi-
lization played a role in the case studies? To this question we now 
turn.  
4.5 Situating the handover in the overall peace process   
Thus far, we have focused on the security re-
quirements for a good handover process. The 
exit of a peace mission must also be linked to 
the broader process of democratization in the 
country. The absence of violence is only one 
indicator of the regulation of conflicts within a 
society into political procedures. Other stabil-
ity indicators include democracy, good gov-
ernance, transparency in public administra-
tion, human rights, rule of law and develop-
ment. The security aspects alone do not make 
a successful peace operation. (Curran & 
Woodhouse, 2007) Without delving too 
deeply into this peacebuilding dilemma, 
some observations from the case studies are 
relevant for the development of the security 
sector. This section offers a brief look at the 
link between the handover process and 
political developments.   
 
Figure 8: UN Military Observers con‐
vey to Sierra Leonean Police Officers 
voters’ complaints about organiza‐
tional problems, Freetown. 
(UNMASIL Photo, 2004) 
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The timing of elections has been widely discussed. Should elections 
mark the start of the democratization process, or can successful elec-
tions guarantee a sustainable result only after a gradual and controlled 
liberalization phase? The latter has been argued by Roland Paris, who 
holds that precipitate elections may endanger the peace process: insti-
tutions should be sufficiently strong to sustain the democratic outcome 
of the elections. (Paris, 2004) For peace missions, elections are per-
ceived as the point at which sustainable peace is possible and a peace 
mission can start to withdraw. (S/2001/394 - No exit without Strategy) 
The end of the electoral process is seen by the international mission as 
the fulfilment of its most important task. Also, in practical terms elec-
tions often, but not always, mark the start of the handover phase.  
 
In our three case studies, the holding of elections influenced the with-
drawal schemes. Significant resources are needed to guarantee a suc-
cessful electoral process. In both Burundi and Sierra Leone, the mo-
ment of elections represented the point of maximum deployment. Af-
terwards, large numbers of troops were no longer required and the first 
contingents could be repatriated. In Sierra Leone, the exit strategy of 
the mission was not discussed until after the elections had proven suc-
cessful and a stable environment had been created. The local popula-
tion and the newly elected government may also perceive the elections 
as the main reason for the peace mission to be present. Therefore it 
should not be surprising if the local population and national actors 
want the peace mission to leave once the electoral process has been 
completed. That was the case in Burundi, where the newly elected 
government demanded mission withdrawal barely a few months after 
the elections. 
 
Elections are more than a visible event: they also confirm the legiti-
macy of the newly elected government. This is important in terms of 
the capacity-building of the security agencies of the state. The police 
and military are from then on the legal providers of security. In the 
mind of the population, their legitimacy leads to acceptance and the 
perception of the security agencies as a neutral service. This outcome 
is also relevant when the opposition is elected. The experience in Bu-
rundi showed how elections may trigger an over-hasty handover proc-
ess when a government wants to prove its capacity to rule, after years 
of international intervention. (Jackson, July 2006)1  
 
Other stability indicators cannot be overlooked, according to Roland 
Paris. The development of the security sector depends on the procla-
mation of a new constitution and laws, as the lack of legislation can 
                                                 
1  The same could be observed after the elections in Timor-Leste in August 2007, when the 
new government scaled down cooperation with the UN mission on SSR. (International 
Crisis Group, 3 December 2009) 
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seriously hinder the capacity-building of the security sector. The op-
erational effectiveness of the police in Timor-Leste was impaired by 
lack of a suitable legal framework, and improvement could be noticed 
only after the establishment of the Police Organic Law and Discipli-
nary Code in 2004. (S/2004/888) Moreover, the national institutions 
are expected to be strong before a peace mission leaves the country. 
Considerable attention was given to institution-building by the inter-
national community in Timor-Leste, and the UN assumed full respon-
sibility for various government tasks. Nevertheless, the reports of the 
UN Secretary-General show that these institutions were still weak 
when UNMISET decided to withdraw. In Timor-Leste, ‘institutional 
development was even more urgently needed than skills development’. 
(International Crisis Group, 3 December 2009) Roland Paris therefore 
argues that it is crucial to focus on building up all essential govern-
ment institutions (Paris, 2004). In Sierra Leone, considerable attention 
was given to building up the army so that they could play a effective 
role during the elections. However, UNAMSIL could have further 
strengthened youth empowerment, justice, democracy consolidation 
and good governance. (Curran & Woodhouse, 2007) At the other end 
of the spectrum, the experience of ONUB in Burundi does indicate 
that overly direct involvement may upset the political environment.  
By working closely together with the transitional administration, 
ONUB compromised the dialogue with potential successor admini-
strations. (Jackson, July 2006). 
 
Here we have only briefly shed a little light on the major debate of the 
link between peacebuilding and peacekeeping. It can be concluded, 
from the case studies, that a stable environment in country cannot be 
achieved by guaranteeing security alone. Security factors need to be 
complemented with other stability factors to identify the appropriate 
point for handover – and these stability factors include more than 
merely holding successful elections.  
 
5. Handling operational dilemmas  
Peace forces are confronted with several crucial operational difficul-
ties during the implementation of exit strategies. Several dilemmas 
were recurrent in the three case studies. Firstly, how to organize the 
shift in task division between international and local actors and how to 
hand over the actual responsibility. A second dilemma involves geo-
graphical factors – how to continue to ensure security in the entire 
country while reducing forces. A third question concerns the friction 
between the internal and external security requirements. We will look 
at how the case studies tried to deal with these dilemmas and conse-
quently describe some challenges for the first two dilemmas. 
5.1 First dilemma: Altering the task division of international 
and local actors 
The first dilemma deals with the gradual shift in the division of tasks 
between the international and the local actors. Between the time where 
the international actors have the full responsibility and the point where 
the local actors are made responsible, there are phases of co-
responsibility and mentoring, according to the UN Consolidation, 
Drawdown and Withdrawal (UN CDW) concept. The local security 
agencies will gradually take over responsibilities, and peacekeepers 
will phase out their executive tasks. Two complementary dynamics 
need thus to be reconciled: the capacity-building of the local security 
forces, and the phasing-out of international forces. International and 
national forces need to agree upon the best moment for the practical 
handover of security responsibilities. This process is not easy, how-
ever. A study of RAMSI, the Australian Assistance Mission to the 
Solomon Islands, described the difficulty as follows: ‘It has been dif-
ficult for RAMSI personnel to make the transition from often doing the 
job themselves – the hallmark of the initial days of the operation – to a 
role more characterized by mentoring and skills transfer. Such a role 
takes more time, and can sometimes be frustrating. But it is critical to 
the ultimate success of the mission.’ (Wainwright, April 2005) Our 
case studies provide some examples of how to make this transition as 
smooth as possible. 
 
The transformation of executive to advisory tasks by international ac-
tors will generally run over or in parallel with training functions. 
Training is an important part of SSR, and its progress is often seen as 
a measure of capacity building. As a result, the training capacity of 
international missions is scaled up to fill the capacity-gaps before the 
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handover date. In UNAMSIL, an additional 128 UN police officers 
were sought to enhance the capacity of the police in Sierra Leone. 
(S/2003/663) As there were 60 UNAMSIL police officers present at 
the time, that meant more than a doubling of the number. Also, ONUB 
intensified its police training work just before exiting. 330 Burundian 
police members were 
trained to take over 
security arrangements 
in Bujumbura and the 
provinces for when 
ONUB left. (S/2006/ 
842) In Timor-Leste, 
police officers with 
specialized qualifica-
tions were deliberately 
retained longer in the 
withdrawal phase. 
(S/2002/1223) 
 
The training consisted of basic training, but further specialized train-
ing could be added to fill some gaps in the delivery of security func-
tions and to meet the needs of the society. In Sierra Leone, special 
training was sought in the matter of the diamond trade. However, that 
post was never filled. (Secretary-General, 19 March 2004) In Timor-
Leste, courses were added on how to address civil disturbances and on 
crowd-control techniques, police administration, border security and 
community policing in response to the demonstrations. (S/2003/243) 
Additional training also concerned human resource management, eth-
ics, sexual violence, human rights, etc.  
 
The number of trained cadets can be used as an initial measure to de-
fine the right point for handing over responsibilities in various areas. 
More substantive developments can also be taken into consideration 
before deciding to transfer authority. This decision-making process is 
best for ensuring the involvement of local ownership. In Sierra Leone, 
joint monitoring mechanisms between national and international ac-
tors were set up to monitor the progress made in the training of the 
police and army. They held regular meetings to follow up on the train-
ing needs of the security sector and provide guidance on the with-
drawal scheme. (S/2002/1417) As a result, a joint decision was made 
amongst national and international stakeholders to extend the mandate 
of UNAMSIL until the end of 2005, by which time it was expected 
that the security sector would be able to assume effective security re-
sponsibility over the entire country. (S/2005/273) 
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When local actors have taken over responsibility, mentoring and ad-
vising is a method that provides low-profile but efficient support. An 
additional advantage is that it can be done by a reduced number of po-
lice officers on the ground. In Burundi, 15 police officers provided 
mentoring in investigation tasks, patrols, report writing and supervi-
sion in Bujumbura in March 2006, when the rest of their 120 col-
leagues had already left the country. (S/2006/163) Mentoring works 
even better if combined with a back-up force. An international re-
sponse unit of 125 police officers remained available in Timor-Leste 
for some months after the official handover of all districts, to provide 
back-up in cases of exceptional need. In parallel, 200 police advisers 
continued to be present in all districts and provided in-service training 
to the deployed national police. (S/2004/117) These remaining advis-
ers conducted train-the-trainers programmes as well. Similar training 
ensures sustainability in capacity-building and moves away from the 
international–national divide.  
 
Another tactic for avoiding an abrupt handover between international 
and local actors is joint operations. This option offers several advan-
tages in the transition phase. Not only do such operations allow inter-
national actors to continue to guarantee security, they are also a good 
tool for capacity-building and confidence-building. Local actors learn 
more in such operations. And if they do fail, the international actors 
can still step in. In UNAMSIL these joint patrols proved successful. 
When they identified considerable shortcomings in the capacity of the 
police, UNAMSIL’s participation was able to deter the threat. In the 
beginning, the visibility of the UN acting with the national actors is 
important for legitimacy and effectiveness. (S/2003/321) Towards the 
end, international forces can then gradually tone down their participa-
tion and visibility. 
 
The specific circumstances in Timor-Leste allowed the situation to go 
one step further in the cooperation between international and local ac-
tors. Building further on the administration of the country by the UN, 
the international and national police operated as a joint service with a 
unified chain of command. As a result, the mission provided a well-
planned education scheme for police officers. After their basic train-
ing, officers were co-located with their UN peers to receive on-the-job 
training. (S/2002/432) The management of the police was executed by 
the UN Police Commissioner until 20 May 2004. (S/2004/117) 
5.2 Challenges for the first dilemma 
The dilemma of executive versus training tasks is made difficult by 
various factors. First, in such moments, the process driver can over-
rule set criteria. This was the case in Burundi. Training tasks became 
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almost the only way to alleviate the risks involved in the swift hand-
over process. The national security agencies were prematurely per-
ceived by the government as capable of taking over security responsi-
bilities in the provinces where safety had been restored. Although the 
UN did not necessarily agree with this assessment, executive security 
tasks were handed over to the national authorities in the first half of 
2006. (S/2005/728) The UN’s cautious reaction can be observed in 
ONUB’s continued patrolling . Despite restrictions by the govern-
ment, ONUB perceived these patrols as a visible effort at providing 
confidence in the more secure eastern provinces and having a positive 
effect on security in the volatile western provinces. (S/2006/163) But 
even training aspects became restricted. The ONUB police component 
was forced to reduce from 120 to 15 police trainers by March 2006, 
who, moreover, could operate only in the capital. (S/2005/728) 
 
Second, handover of security responsibilities to local actors depends 
on the progress in SSR and DDR. These programmes often complicate 
the handover process, for various reasons. SSR and DDR take in gen-
eral more time than the framework of a peace mission. In practical 
terms, it is not always possible to reintegrate a large number of ex-
combatants at the same time. The National Committee for DDR in Si-
erra Leone foresaw the reintegration of 7,000 soldiers every six 
months. In 2002, this would mean that the remaining 24,000 out of 
55,000 could be fully reintegrated only at the end of 2004. In the 
meantime, these groups of demobilized soldiers meant a threat to sta-
bility, or they risked being recruited into neighbouring Liberia. 
(Secretary-General, 5 September 2002) A further time challenge is the 
short assignments of international police officers and the military. 
These do not allow sustainable trust-relations to be built up with the 
local counterparts, and make it difficult for the personnel to become 
familiar with the local culture, customs and laws. 
 
The lack of funding is an additional problem. DDR programmes need 
large amounts of cash to pay out former combatants. These funds must 
come from international donors and are not necessarily available over 
the UN budget. In addition, SSR requires considerable finances to 
purchase equipment and provide accommodation, the absence of 
which can become a major obstacle to the handover process. Lack of 
equipment seriously slowed down the capacity-building of the security 
sector in all case studies. In Sierra Leone, the problem had been iden-
tified already in 2002 (S/2002/987), but a full solution had still not 
been found when the mission left.  
 
Further, having underdeveloped infrastructure makes it difficult to 
train significant numbers of police personnel in a short time. While 
there were sufficient police candidates in Sierra Leone, the academy 
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in Hastings simply did not have the means to train a large number 
quickly. (S/2003/321) The expansion of the police school remained 
the responsibility of Sierra Leone, although bilateral donors partially 
solved the problem. (S/2003/1201) 
 
An additional difficulty is to altering the culture of security agencies. 
In conflict situations, security agencies often behave no better than the 
rebels they are fighting. Therefore, it is not enough to train the na-
tional security agencies in professional knowledge and skills: ethics 
and discipline also have to be imparted. Professional, well-disciplined 
security agencies do not emerge over night. In all three cases studies, 
the police and army lacked discipline. In Burundi, they were accused 
of human rights violations. (S/2006/851) – but plans to professionalize 
the national army and police structures were made only two months 
before the exit of ONUB. (S/2006/842) Disturbing reports of police 
misconduct, involvement in crime, bribery, and excessive use of force 
and physical assault of the population were received in Timor-Leste 
(S/2003/944), where therefore special attention was directed to trans-
forming the police in a non-political and impartial force. (S/2004/888) 
A further challenge was to create self-confidence in the new troops of 
Timor-Leste. Finally, DDR processes may fail easily if the rebels are 
not ready to disarm, as in the DDR attempts in Sierra Leone in 1999. 
Not only the rebels but also the population needs to be ready for 
peace. The population needs to have confidence in the security struc-
ture in a country, regardless of a lack of equipment of funds. When a 
lack of confidence cannot be compensated for, the exit of a peace mis-
sion may lead to a perceived or real security vacuum. In Burundi, this 
was rather contradictory. While the population favoured the departure 
of ONUB, there was no widespread civilian confidence in the capacity 
of the national police. Whereas 40% of the population were very con-
fident, over 40% were only somewhat confident and the others not at 
all. (Krasno, June 2006) Also in Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste, initia-
tives were taken to enhance the reputation of the army as a disciplined 
force. (S/2003/663) (S/2003/243) In addition, the population needs to 
understand why a peace mission is withdrawing, to counteract fears of 
being abandoned. Public campaigns can help here. 
5.3 Second dilemma: Continuing to guarantee widespread 
security  
A second dilemma is how to continue to secure the entire country with 
fewer and fewer troops on the ground. The local security forces slowly 
take over responsibility for the area of operations. However, these 
forces may lack the necessary expertise or confidence to fully secure 
the area. In order to ensure a gradual and effective handover, the in-
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ternational peace force will need to find a way to prevent a relapse 
into conflict and violence.  
 
According to the withdrawal concept in peace missions, those troops 
that are no longer operationally necessary will be the first to be repa-
triated. This concept was explicitly referred to for UNAMSIL. 
(S/2002/987) UNAMSIL first handed over three areas where there ex-
isted minimal risk of insecurity. In a second phase, the troops were 
reorganized into three instead of five areas: west, east and centre. In a 
final phase, these areas were then handed over. (S/2002/1417) During 
this handover and withdrawal process, it was crucial to maintain a 
presence throughout the country. Only then could security be guaran-
teed until all troops had gone. (S/2002/987) This continued presence 
could become a deterrent to remaining security threats. In Timor-
Leste, the military component of UNMISET was to be reconfigured in 
that direction at the point when the national army took over responsi-
bility for external security. (S/2003/243) 
 
Troops in strategic areas were 
the last to leave. Borders 
were essential to guarantee 
territorial security. In 
Burundi, the peace forces 
were redeployed to the three 
border northwestern prov-
inces of Bujumbura Rural, 
Bubanza and Cibitoke in the 
first phase of the withdrawal. 
These areas caused most 
concern due to the ongoing 
fighting between the national army and the rebel movement FNL. 
Also illicit cross-border activities persisted, mainly involving the 
smuggling of small arms. Finally, it was in these areas that many in-
ternational civilian agencies operated. Guaranteeing their security also 
had to be handed over to the national actors, but that is a sensitive is-
sue. ONUB thus focused on monitoring the borders through area mo-
bile operations and visible and proactive patrolling. Through coordi-
nation mechanisms at Force Headquarters level, the handover ran 
slower and was based on more intense cooperation. (S/2005/728) In 
addition, ONUB, in cooperation with the peace mission in DRC, exe-
cuted maritime patrolling on Lake Tanganyika for as long as possible. 
(S/2006/842) In Timor-Leste, the area next to the temporary border, 
the so-called Tactical Coordination Line, received a larger military 
presence whilst joint government and UNMISET operations took 
place. (S/2003/243) 
 
Figure 9: ONUB Forces to check security situation 
(UN Photo) 
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Another strategic location is the capital of a country. In the last phase 
of operations in Sierra Leone, the peacekeeping troops pulled back to 
Freetown and Lungi peninsulas, whereas local actors took over re-
sponsibility for the hinterlands. (S/2002/987) In Timor-Leste, troops 
withdrew to the volatile western provinces and to the capital, Dili. 
(S/2003/243) Dili district was the last under UNMISET police respon-
sibility. (S/2003/944). It was handed over only in December 2003, 
shortly before UNMISET pulled out. (S/2004/117) 
  
Other strategic areas may be added, depending on the context. For Si-
erra Leone, the benchmarks identified additional unstable regions. 
They included areas where former combatants were located whilst 
awaiting the process of reintegration into society. Leaving those areas 
would be seen as a risk. (S/2002/987) The mining areas were also 
considered a priority, since illicit mining and international trade had 
fuelled the war in the recent past and these areas continued to attract 
problematic youth groups and illicit traders. (S/2002/1417) 
 
While concentrating on these areas, tactics had to be developed for 
maintaining security in the areas already handed over. Mobility and 
flexibility are key concepts here. The use of mobile quick-response 
teams proved advantageous. UNAMSIL relied on helicopter capacity 
to deploy quickly. (S/2003/321) The support of this air-deployable 
quick-reaction force could be requested in vacated areas by military 
observers or by national actors. (S/2003/663) In Timor-Leste, an in-
ternational police Rapid Intervention Unit was set up to support the 
national police in security incidents. (S/2003/944) Attempts were 
made to translate the same concept to the national level, but encoun-
tered logistical constraints. (S/2004/117)  
 
Another tactic is to increase the number of military observers, as was 
done in the insecure western provinces of Burundi. (S/2006/163) In 
Sierra Leone, civilian police, civilian affairs and human resource offi-
cers stayed longer in the vacated areas to support the local structures 
and to monitor developments. (S/2003/1201) In Timor-Leste, military 
observers continued to monitor and exert an advisory presence in ar-
eas that had been handed over. (S/2003/243) 
5.4 Challenges for the second dilemma 
The tactic of concentrating on strategic areas while at the same time 
backing up the rest of the country seemed to work in all three cases 
studied. Nevertheless, some difficulties need to be taken into account.  
 
First, internal and external events during the withdrawal phase cannot 
always be predicted. Many different insecurities need to be taken into 
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account in the withdrawal schedule. ONUB wanted to maintain suffi-
cient forces in case a ceasefire between the government and the FNL 
should be achieved before the end of December 2006. (S/2006/163) 
While such a ceasefire did indeed come, implementation of the 
agreement took too long for the ONUB soldiers to take up their tasks. 
Further, border monitoring can also complicate matters. Border devel-
opments are seldom under the control of the peace mission, and plan-
ning to cope with external threats is not always possible. In addition, 
securing a border requires considerable resources that may impede the 
possibility of securing areas elsewhere in the country. In Sierra Leone, 
no less than one third of the army was deployed at the border. That 
added to the delayed deployment of the national army and over-
stretched the army then under development. (S/2003/321) 
 
When demands on the ground require troops to stay longer, the troop-
contributing country needs to agree to stay longer and be redeployed. 
In Timor-Leste, this flexibility was specifically sought when the with-
drawal plan had to be adjusted. (S/2003/243) In addition, the UN Se-
curity Council will need to agree to bear the additional costs.  
5.5 Third dilemma: Synchronizing internal and external secu-
rity requirements  
A final challenge is to reconcile the needs of reforming both the inter-
nal and the external security forces. First, investing in both agencies 
may overstretch a peace mission. Second, frictions between the police 
and the army are not excluded.  
 
The case studies indicate that the outcome of SSR can be enhanced 
when two different actors lead the reform of the police and of the 
army, respectively. Coordination is an obvious requirement here. The 
prime advantage of bilateral support is the time-frame. Peace missions 
mostly pull out after four or five years, whereas bilateral donors may 
commit to longer-term investment in a country. Since SSR can easily 
require up to ten years after a country has achieved peace, bilateral 
donors are thus advantageous. This was the case in Sierra Leone. The 
reform of the military was carried out by the UK, and the UK was also 
involved in the reform of the police. The UK was not integrated in the 
UN chain of command. (Curran & Woodhouse, 2007) As a result of 
this additional bilateral support, the UK could more efficiently fill up 
existing gaps and plan for the longer term. The coordination between 
the military and the police was also easier since both were trained and 
mentored by external security sources. In Timor-Leste, the UN Secre-
tary-General called for bilateral assistance to complement UNMISET 
efforts. Such bilateral training is more focused, and also brings in 
more resources. (S/2004/888)  
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Second, it would be wrong to portray the police and military as one 
entity. The cases studied indicate numerous frictions between both. In 
Timor-Leste, there was an incident that resulted in some police offi-
cers being detained by army officers (S/2004/117) .Similar events oc-
curred in Sierra Leone, as with the arrest of an army officer who at-
tacked a police officer on duty during the Easter Monday parade. 
(S/2004/536) Both peace missions encouraged a mutual understanding 
through joint exercises or the establishment of coordination mecha-
nisms. One significant explanation of this friction is lack of under-
standing of the other’s role. As of February 2005, the government of 
Timor-Leste had still not defined the respective roles of the army and 
the police for maintaining internal security. (S/2005/99) The estab-
lishment of special police units for rapid response purposes also 
blurred the lines between police and military, as these special units 
had been trained in paramilitary tactics and used heavy weaponry. The 
consequences of their confusing roles could be observed in the later 
2006 crisis. (International Crisis Group, 3 December 2009)   
 
In conclusion, then, handling these three operational dilemmas seems 
crucial to implementing a successful handover. We would like to em-
phasize that planning needs to remain flexible. However, if national 
security forces are not fully capable, that should be acknowledged and 
not be disguised behind false optimism. Only if international forces 
are still present in the country can incompetence be counterbalanced 
by providing additional training to the national forces. Miscalculating 
the capacity of the national security agencies can have serious conse-
quences for the morale of the national troops and the confidence of the 
population. Therefore, the best time for handover should be assessed 
very carefully. 
6. Evaluation of the handover in the 
case studies 
By examining the outcome of the peace missions used as case studies 
we can offer an evaluation of the factors in the handover process.  
 
 UNAMSIL seems to score well on almost all factors considered in 
this report. An exit strategy may not have been present in the mis-
sion’s mandate, but withdrawal planning occurred well in advance and 
was based on realistic expectations. The handover process was driven 
by consent of national and international actors, and extending the mis-
sion was a mutual decision. In addition, benchmarks were guided by 
security concerns, but also took into account security threats arising 
from social and economic sectors. As to the operational dilemmas, 
several compromises were found. Strategic areas, including the min-
ing areas, were secured concurrently with the presence of a mobile 
quick-reaction team. The settlement of the conflict in Liberia ensured 
territorial security along the borders. Finally, investments made by the 
UK in particular achieved satisfactory results in the structuring of the 
army and police.  
 
When UNAMSIL pulled out, other parallel peace-support elements 
were maintained. The support of the UK and IMATT continued after 
the end of the peace mission, ensuring qualitative development of the 
army in the longer run. In addition, UNAMSIL pulled out once the 
national police were capable of dealing with the occasional internal 
security incidents. The competence of the police remained,  despite 
the continuous problem of insufficient equipment. ‘It is widely ac-
knowledged in Sierra Leone and abroad that the successful elections 
(in 2007) were a testament to the efficiency of the police, ..., who de-
ployed well-trained forces, anticipated potential outbreaks and used 
non-lethal crowd control methods...’  (International Crisis Group, 31 
July 2008) 
 
Today, Sierra Leone remains amongst the poorest countries in the 
world, but the main challenges facing the country are no longer con-
flict-related. Government institutions, for example, are still not suffi-
ciently strong. However, those are ‘normal’ development issues, and 
the current peacebuilding mission still has work to do. State-building 
takes longer than the time of a peace mission. 
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 UNMISET can best be described as a promising peace mission 
whose successes could not be maintained after its departure. The mis-
sion in Timor-Leste seemed to have it all. It could build upon remark-
able achievements of previous UN involvements. Local ownership 
and legitimacy were taken into consideration. Before the mission was 
deployed, an exit plan existed, with clear and balanced benchmarks. 
That plan proved flexible even when the mandate was extended for 
one year, following several security incidents. Despite all these 
achievements, the situation after UNAMSIL looked gloomy.  
 
Upon the mission’s departure, a follow-on mission, UNOTIL, was es-
tablished, with a focus on support to state institutions, the further de-
velopment of the police and democratic governance and human rights. 
A 144-strong back-up security force was recommended by the UN 
Secretary-General, but was not subsequently authorized. (S/2005/310) 
In February 2006, demonstrations by soldiers resulted in serious 
clashes between the national police and the national army. Youth 
groups took advantage of the security vacuum to create utter chaos. 
The government called upon the UN, which consequently authorized 
an Australian-led multinational force to restore order. In August 2006, 
another peace operation was authorized: the United Nations Integrated 
Mission in Timor-Leste, UNMIT. This new mission included 1,500 
UN police officials to maintain order and support the development of 
the national police. The remaining multinational force was tasked with 
further training the national army. (Higashi, March 2009)  However, 
the handover process of UNMISET probably occurred too soon and 
was not guided by the developments on the ground. While the gov-
ernment requested a continuation of the UN presence for an additional 
year (S/2005/99), the international mission was withdrawn, for finan-
cial and overstretch reasons. Timor-Leste was an infant nation whose 
institutions had been destroyed or damaged in the conflict and had to 
be built from scratch.  Starting from zero could have meant an oppor-
tunity. However, lack of self-confidence and experience led to inade-
quate responses to security incidents. 
 
The current situation seems more stable, although on 11 February 
2008 the president barely survived an assassination attempt. The secu-
rity sector is still reported to suffer from the same dysfunctional prob-
lems that existed during UNMISET. (International Crisis Group, 9 
February 2009) Also for this second handover, the same challenges 
remain in building up a police force that can be sustainable in the long 
term. According to a report of the International Crisis Group, the 
handover process is hampered by a ‘bureaucratic and protracted’ ap-
proach. There is a lack of a joint UN–government plan for institutional 
development of the police forces. As a result, the handover of execu-
tive responsibilities is too slow; and the training, mentoring and advi-
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sory tasks remained unsatisfactory as of late 2009. (International 
Crisis Group, 3 December 2009) It is thus not the security incidents 
that should create concern, but rather the continuing inability of insti-
tutions to deal with them. 
 
 ONUB was a peace mission that became overruled by political 
events in the country. The pressure exerted by the national govern-
ment for the withdrawal of peace troops made for a hasty handover 
process. Planning occurred barely a year before the last peace troops 
left Burundi and there was no time to identify clear benchmarks. De-
spite – or thanks to – this time pressure, the transition phase was 
straightforward enough. The remaining time was used to scale up the 
training programmes for the national security forces. Intensive border 
patrolling and cooperation with MONUC managed to contain security 
threats. Flexibility in planning was clearly lacking, even when a cease-
fire agreement with the remaining rebel force was eventually reached. 
Bilateral assistance had to compensate for ONUB in this regard. Not-
withstanding the obvious positive achievements of ONUB in merely 
two years, substantial political, security, economic and social chal-
lenges remained when the mission departed. The follow-on peace-
building mission BINUB eventually included the continuation of 
ONUB programmes: developing a comprehensive plan for SSR and 
completing the programme for demobilization and reintegration of 
former combatants, and there was extensive transition planning be-
tween ONUB and BINUB. 
 
The outstanding issues at the time ONUB withdrew still hung like a 
dark cloud over the country. The volatile regional dimension with the 
ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo has not altered. 
The consequences of the incomplete SSR still persist today. In 2009, 
the last rebel force, Palipehutu-FNL, finally laid down weapons and 
was integrated into the security forces. They participate in the political 
scene, although they have not been completely demobilized. Concerns 
still exist that the former rebel parties will again take up their arms to 
win the 2010 elections. (International Crisis Group, 30 July 2009) 
Remarkably, the initial concern of a unilateral process driver did bene-
fit the handover process. In the end, the transition phase can fall back 
on local ownership. Legitimacy and stability in the longer term may 
thus have been achieved. 
 
The cases studied show that there is no single recipe for a successful 
handover. Factors vary in significance from case to case, with no one 
factor that automatically guarantees success. A good handover results 
from the combination of all factors placed in a context-sensitive 
framework and supported by the determination of all stakeholders. 
7. Conclusion: Lessons for future 
handovers 
The empirical data extracted from the three case studies can be sum-
marized in the diagram on the next page. The figure shows the hand-
over process in the context of the post-war reconstruction process. The 
horizontal axis depicts the different phases: conflict, intervention 
phase, stabilization phase and normalization phase. The vertical axis 
shows the degree of responsibility for security issues in a society. The 
diagram translates the actions of both international and national actors 
into two simplified comparisons. Once the end of the conflict has been 
reached, major responsibility for security lies with the international 
actors. As the peace process develops, this responsibility lessens, as 
does the number of international troops and police. National actors 
undergo the opposite process. During the intervention phase, national 
actors have only limited involvement in guaranteeing the stability of 
the country. Their responsibilities then grow with time, until local ac-
tors have become the sole providers of security. The intersection be-
tween both trends is the moment of handover. 
 
The handover process should be guided by a several factors, none of 
which alone can determine the success of the process. We conclude 
that all aspects should receive appropriate consideration, to increase 
the chances for a successful handover. 
 
Before the Intervention phase 
 Exit planning should ideally take place even before an interna-
tional mission intervenes. This enables the identification of 
context-specific priorities of the mission. An exit strategy 
should further make a link with the expected post-mission 
situation. The mission can then react proactively to the chal-
lenges involved in achieving a stable situation. Plans can be 
adjusted later as new information becomes available.  
 
The Intervention phase 
 DDR will normally start shortly after the end of the conflict, 
but its completion will most likely take place only further into 
the peace process. DDR is important for a handover, for two 
reasons. First, unless the former combatants can be integrated, 
they will remain as a security threat, and a relapse into conflict 
is possible. Second, depending on the results of DDR pro-
grammes, progress can be made in security sector reform.  
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 A certain degree of political progress should ideally take place 
before the handover, for two reasons. First, transition requires 
a level of institutional development to guarantee sustainable 
peace. Second, elections consolidate the legitimacy of the gov-
ernment. This legitimacy is important if the population is to 
accept and have confidence in the new security agencies. This 
feature is relevant also if the ruling party is changed after the 
elections.  
 SSR is a key undertaking for handover. Without proper devel-
opment of the police and the army, the handover is likely to 
fail. Training must start well in advance of the anticipated 
handover date, to allow time to build up a capable and substan-
tial force. That time can also be used to foresee logistical and 
financial gaps. Practical and easily-remedied problems can 
cause serious delays in the handover process.  
 The peace mission should be guided in the implementation of 
its mission by clear and measurable benchmarks. Security re-
quirements should receive priority, but it is important to rec-
ognize that security threats also originate as a result of eco-
nomic and social issues. Refugee populations and unemployed 
youth can provide fertile recruiting grounds for spoilers.  
 
The handover phase 
Benchmarks identify the right moment for handover. At that point, 
several operational dilemmas need to be recognized in order to pro-
vide for a gradual and sustainable transition.  
 A first dilemma concerns the crossing point of task division 
between the international and national actors. The first will al-
ter their functions from executive to advisory functions, while 
the latter make the opposite movement. This transition needs 
to be accompanied by a wide range of training and mentoring 
work.  
 Second, there is the geographical Catch-22 situation of how to 
deal with the unbalanced ‘troops versus area-of-operations’ 
rate. Good practices include focusing on strategic areas while 
maintaining a back-up force for the remaining areas. 
 A third problem is the ambiguous relation between internal 
and external security requirements. The involvement of bilat-
eral donors can prove efficient and effective for SSR. In addi-
tion, international actors need to establish means to tackle the 
friction between both types of security agencies during the 
handover. 
 
Stabilization phase 
 National security agencies need to demonstrate their capacity 
to maintain law and order after the handover – a capacity 
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based not only upon numbers of graduated cadets. Lack of 
self-confidence or experience has to be overcome at this stage. 
 A next step is to professionalize the security agencies. This re-
quires a change in organizational culture to ensure that human 
rights violations and corruption are no longer acceptable. The 
local population should be able to trust in the security provid-
ers. Good practices include campaigns explaining the mis-
sion’s exit. 
 International troops should ideally remain present after the 
handover moment, to provide back-up capabilities if required 
by the local actors. Mobility is a prerequisite to enable an im-
mediate reaction and to isolate and resolve any security inci-
dents. 
 Above all, the handover process should remain flexible. If a 
planned course of action seems likely to fail, international 
forces must be able to adapt their withdrawal to meet the needs 
of the situation. 
 
Risks 
Two main risks for the handover processes can be identified: 
 The process may be unequally driven by the local or the inter-
national actors, adding to the risk of a premature handover. 
This happens when the international actors have not fully 
achieved the planned benchmarks or when national actors have 
not built up sufficient capacity. Therefore, the process should 
be driven by consensus involving national and international 
stakeholders. Local ownership is indispensable to the long-
term sustainability of the results of the handover.  
 On the other side of the handover process lingers the danger of 
continued violence. The risk is especially high when the two 
conditions of the national actors after the handover – capacity 
and professionalism – are not met. Poor national capacity leads 
to badly managed security incidents. Lack of professionalism 
results in grievances amongst the population. International ac-
tors can moderate the risk of such a security vacuum by apply-
ing mobility and flexibility. In a worst-case scenario, such vio-
lence may lead to a situation requiring new international inter-
vention. 
 
At their arrival, peace missions are expected to build up security in a 
chaotic environment. Successful peace missions only leave a country 
when this vacuum has been transformed in a functioning institutional 
environment to whom they can effectively handover the task of guar-
anteeing long-term safety and security for the country and its popula-
tion. 
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